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THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL POWER OVER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS*
Vm~i. V. Bisnop, JR.**
t DISCUSSING the structure of federal power over foreign affairs,
it seems appropriate to examine the problems first from the
standpoint of our own constitutional law and then to see what inter-
national law may contribute to our understanding of the subject.
It is desirable to look at the general power to carry on foreign
affairs, which lies solely with the federal government rather than
with our several states and over which the federal executive has
predominant influence. Then it seems well to look at the power
to make international agreements, both in the form of treaties and
of agreements made by the executive alone or by the executive with
the collaboration of both Houses of Congress. Our powers with
respect to international organizations should be touched on and
bare mention made of the war power. Turning to the viewpoint of
international law, the United States is seen to have the same powers
as any other nation, regardless of political structure. Finally, regard-
less of all questions of legal powers, the really important thing to
stress is the need for cooperation between the organs of government,
rather than to emphasize the constitutional system of "checks and
balances"; our system of government works well if there is both
the will and the understanding needed to make its operation effective.
What does the Constitution say about powers with respect to
foreign affairs? In the first place, the President is given the power
to "nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
... appoint" ambassadors, other diplomatic officers and consuls;
*A paper presented to the International Law Roundtable of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools at Denver, Dec. 29, 1951.
**Professor of Law, University of Michigan (with the assistance of
Douglass E. Dayton, University of Michigan Law School).
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and to "receive ambassadors and other public ministers." He is
made the "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States." He is given the "Power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur." He is charged with "care that
the aws be faithfully executed." Finally, we note that "the Execu-
tive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." These indeed are broad grants of power to deal with
the field of foreign affairs, and the interpretations placed upon
them by the courts and by the other organs of our government
to broaden rather than to narrow the executive control over foreign
relations.
The Senate has specific functions with respect to the approval
of treaties and the confirmation of diplomatic and consular officials
of the United States. In fields touching upon foreign affairs Congress
is given the power to regulate foreign commerce, to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization, to regulate the value of foreign
coin, to "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offenses against the law of nations," "To declare
war... and make rules concerning captures on land and water,"
"To raise and support armies" and "To provide and maintain a
navy," and "To make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces."
Finally, the several States are prohibited from entering into
"any treaty, alliance, or confederation," and "No State shall, with-
out the consent of Congress, .. . keep troops or ships of war in time
of peace, enter into agreement or compact with another State, or
with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or
in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."
In the course of his opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corporation Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the
colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty
passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the
colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies
were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency
-namely the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from
the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war
and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted
the Declaration of Independence. . . .When, therefore, the
external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies
ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.
[Vol. 36:299
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".... In this vast external realm, with its important, compli-
cated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As
Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the
House of Representatives, 'The President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations.' Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613."'
Determination of Policy
In the day to day conduct of foreign affairs the most important
power of the President lies in his control over the formulation of
foreign policy and the execution of such policy through the De-
partment of State and American diplomatic and consular representa-
tives abroad, the executive being the channel through which com-
munications from foreign governments are received.2 Undoubtedly
the Senate or the House of Representatives or both Houses of
Congress may by resolution express their views regarding the
proper action to take in any international political incident, but it is
the executive branch of the government which has the authority
and the responsibility to formulate the policy and make the decisions.
Leaving aside the specific powers granted to Congress in such mat-
ters as the declaration of war, maintenance of our military forces,
control over foreign commerce, and the "power of the purse
strings," Congress lacks legal capacity to determine what shall be
the course of action in foreign affairs. Of course no President or
Secretary of State will in practice disregard the views of Congress
or of its more influential members, any more than they will dis-
regard public opinion. However, unless one of the specific powers
of Congress (or the Senate) is involved, there seems to be no legal
method of constraint upon the freedom of executive discretion in
matters of foreign affairs-save in so far as the possibility of im-
peachment may lie in the background.
As an example of this federal executive control over the formu-
lation of policy, and as a power specifically derived from that to
send and receive ambassadors, we find that the decision of the
executive is completely controlling on the question of whether to
recognize or to deny recognition to a foreign state or government.
1. 299 U. S. 304, 316-317, 319 (1936).
2. On the executive as the sole proper channel of communication with
foreign nations, see 4 Moore, Digest of International Law 680 (1906) [sub-
sequently cited as Moore's Digest] ; 4 Hackworth's Digest of International
Law 642 (1940-1944) [subsequently cited as Hackworth's Digest].
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At times Congress has been consulted or has expressed its views
in advance. In 1906 John Bassett Moore. wrote:
"In every case, as it appears, of a new government and of
belligerency, the question of recognition was determined solely
by the Executive. In the case of the Spanish-American republics,
of Texas, of Hayti, and of Liberia, the President, before recog-
nizing the new state, invoked the judgment and cooperation of
Congress; and in each of these cases provision was made for
the appointment of a minister, which, when made in due form,
constitutes . ..according to the rules of international law, a
formal recognition. In numerous other cases the recognition was
given by the Executive solely on his own responsibility." 3
In 1819 Monroe's Cabinet discussed the question of recognition of
the newly formed Latin-American Republics. Attorney General
Wirt and Secretary of the Treasury Crawford thought approval of
the Senate, and House appropriation for ministers' salaries, desirable.
Secretary of State J. Q. Adams took a strongly contrary position,
pointing out that Washington and Madison as Presidents had made
their own decisions on recognition. In his message to Congress
March 8, 1822, presenting the question of recognition, President
Monroe said he did so in order that there might be "such cooperation
between the two departments of the Government as their respective
rights and duties may require." He recommended recognition and
suggested that if Congress concurred they would make the necessary
appropriation. $100,000 was appropriated "for such missions to the
independent nations of the American continent as the President
... may deem proper.' 4
It seems perfectly clear at the present time that the legal power
to decide whether to recognize the Chinese Communists or the
Nationalists as the Government of China rests in the hands of the
President alone.5 Indeed, it was held in United States v. Pink that
the power to recognize the Soviet Government carried with it "the
power, without the consent of -the Senate, to determine the public
policy of the United States with respect to the Russian nationaliza-
tion decrees" and their effect on property which was in the United
States. In this respect the Court held that "the power of a State
to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs
counter to the public policy of the forum ... must give way before
the superior Federal policy.""
3. 1 Moore's Digest 243-244.
4. Id. at 244-245.
5. 1 Hackworth's Digest 161-165.
6. 315 U. S. 203, 229, 231 (1942).
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Furthermore, we find that the courts refrain from passing upon
many of these questions involving foreign affairs, calling them
"political questions." Thus in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., Justice
Clarke said:
"The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative
-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." '7
Applying this principle, Justice Gray said in Jones v. United States:
"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is
not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any gov-
ernment conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other offi-
cers, citizens and subjects of that government.""
Treaty-making Power
The constitutional provision with respect to the making of
treaties is broad and unlimited in its scope. The Constitution states
that "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme lav of the land.... ." No
treaty has ever as yet been held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, although the Court feels free to pass upon the question of
constitutionality of treaties. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will ever hold a treaty unconstitutional, since it is difficult to
to conceive of two-thirds of the Senate approving any treaty which
the Court would hold unconstitutional, even if the executive branch
7. 246 U. S. 297, 302 (1918). See also to similar effect United States v.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 634 (U.S. 1818); Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 516
(U.S. 1838); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420 (U.S. 1839);
Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657 (U.S. 1853); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U. S. 698, 712 (1893) ; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 285-288(1902) ; Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 32 (1907) ; 1 Moore's Digest 743(1906) ; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 485 (1924). Cf. Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943) ; Repub-
lic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30 (1945) ; Note, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
79 (1948); Lyons, Conclusiveness of the Suggestion and Certificate of the
American State Department, [1947] Britsh Yearbook of International Law
116.
8. 137 U. S. 202, 212 (1890). In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U. S. 126, 137 (1938), Justice Stone said:
"What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign
sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial question, and is to be
determined by the political department of the government. Objections to its
determination as well as to the underlying policy are to be addressed to it
and not to the courts. Its action in recognizing a foreign government and
in receiving its diplomatic representatives is conclusive on all domestic courts,
which are bound to accept that determination, although they are free to draw
for themselves its legal consequences in litigations pending before them."
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of the government should go so far as to conclude it. It is far more
likely that the President and Senate will prove unwilling to go even
so far in the exercise of the treaty-making power as the Supreme
Court might well allow.
In the early days of the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson wrote
in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice that proper subjects of
the treaty-making power: (1) must concern the foreign nation;
(2) must be "objects which are usually regulated by treaty, and
cannot be otherwise regulated"; (3) must not include "the rights
reserved to the states"; and (4) must also exclude "subjects of
legislation" upon which power was conferred on the Congress.,
What is left at the present time of Jefferson's criteria? The
last is clearly incorrect; from the very beginning of our government
treaties have been made with respect to foreign commerce, customs
tariffs, naturalization, and numerous other topics with respect to
which Congress is expressly granted power to legislate. With re-
spect to a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in 1844, criticizing a proposed reciprocity treaty with Prussia on
the ground of the lack of "constitutional competency" to make a
treaty allegedly invading the field of legislative powers delegated
to Congress, Secretary of State Calhoun wrote:
"If this be the true view of the treaty-making power, it may
be truly said that its exercise has been one continual series of
habitual and uninterrupted infringements of the Constitution.
So far, indeed, is it from being true, as the report supposes,
that the mere fact of a power being delegated to Congress ex-
cludes it from being the subject of treaty stipulations, that even
its exclusive delegation, if we may judge from the habitual prac-
tice of the government, does not-of which the power of appro-
priating money affords a striking example. It is expressly and
exclusively delegated to Congress, and yet scarcely a treaty has
9. "By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legis-
lation is confined to two branches only, of the ordinary legislature; the
President originating, and the Senate having a negative. To what subject this
power extends, has not been defined in detail by the Constiution, nor are we
entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It is admitted that it must concern the
foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity, res inter
alios acta. (2) By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must
have intended to comprehend only those objects which are usually regulated by
treaty, and can not be otherwise regulated. (3) It must have meant to except
out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the President and
Senate can not do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from
doing in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of legislation in
which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This last excep-
tion is denied by some, on the ground that it would leave very little matter for
the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say others." 5 foore's
Digest 162.
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been made of any importance which does not stipulate for the
payment of money. No objection has ever been made on this
account. The only question ever raised in reference to it is,
whether Congress has not unlimited discretion to grant or with-
hold the appropriation." 10
As for matters normally reserved to the states, the Supreme
Court in a long series of cases has approved action by the treaty
power even though Congress might lack the power to make laws
in the absence of treaty. Although the control of a state over debts
would normally not fall within the federal power, in Ware v.
Hylton" the Supreme Court held that the treaty of peace with
Great Britain enabled British creditors to recover debts from
American citizens who had paid such debts into the Virginia State
Treasury during the Revolution under the authority of a Virginia
law sequestrating debts owed to British subjects.
Obviously the power of a state over the ownership and devolu-
tion of real property within its borders is normally unaffected by the
powers delegated to Congress. Nevertheless, from early times the
Supreme Court has upheld and given effect to treaties between the
United States and foreign nations under which aliens were given
rights and privileges with respect to the acquisition or inheritance
of real and personal property located within our states. As the Su-
preme Court said in Hauenstein v. Lynham, "We have no doubt
that this treaty is within the treaty-making power conferred by the
Constitution."' 2 On this question Secretary of State Livingston
wrote to the Russian charg6 d'affaires in 1831,
10. Secretary Calhoun to Mr. Wheaton, minister to Prussia, June 28,
1844; see 5 Moore's Digest 164. See also speech of Sen. Kellogg of Minne-
sota of August 7, 1919, 58 Cong. Rec. 3680 (1919) ; 5 Hackworth's Digest
10-13.
11. 3 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796). See also Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454
(U.S. 1806). In the Ware case, Justice Chase expressed doubt whether the
Court had power to declare a treaty void, saying "If the court possess a
power to declare treaties void, I shall never exercise it but in a very clear case
indeed." 3 Dall. 199, 237 (U.S. 1796). On this point see also United States v.
Reid, 73 F. 2d 153, 155 (9th Cir. 1934).
12. 100 U. S. 483, 490 (1879). The power to make such treaties has been
taken for granted, often without any lengthy discussion. E.g., Chirac v. Chirac.
2 Wheat. 259 (U.S. 1817) ; Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch
603 (U.S. 1813) ; Craig v. Bradford, 3 Wheat. 594 (U.S. 1818) ; Society v.
New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (U.S. 1823) ; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 (U.S.
1830) ; Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 (1929) ; Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S.
503 (1947) ; see Davis, J., in United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U. S. 188, 197-198 (1876). Cf. doubts expressed by Taney, C. J., in Prevost v.
Greneaux, 19 How. 1, 7 (U.S. 1856) (held treaty inapplicable under its own
terms to case involved) ; statement of Campbell, J., leaving the question open
in Frederickson v. Louisiana, 23 How. 445, 448 (U.S. 1859).
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"By the Federal Constitution the several States retained
all the attributes of sovereignty which were not granted to the
general government. The right of regulating successions in re-
lation to the subject in question is not among those conceded
rights; consequently it was reserved to, and is still vested in,
the several States. But by the same Constitution it is provided
that treaties made under the authority of the general govern-
ment shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the con-
stitution or laws of a State to the contrary notwithstanding." 13
In 1920 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Migratory
Bird Treaty of 1916 with Great Britain,'14 despite the contention
that the treaty and the statute of 1918 implementing it violated the
reserved powers of the states. In this famous case of Missouri v.
Holland, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the
United States,15 because by Article II, § 2, the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made
under the authority of the United States, along with the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land....
"It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the
Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-
making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of
Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers re-
served to the States, a treaty cannot do. An earlier act of Con-
gress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to
regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States had
been held bad in the District Court. United States v. Shauvcr,
214 Fed. Rep. 154. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. Rep.
288....
"Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not
they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power. Acts of
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be
so when made under the authority of the United States. It is
open to question whether the authority of the United States
means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the con-
vention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications
to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a
different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of
13. 5 Moore's Digest 177.
14. 39 Stat. 1702 (1916). For the implementing statute, see 40 Stat. 755
(1918).
15. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people."
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Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters
requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be
found.""
In like vein, Chief Justice Hughes said of treaties with Persia and
Italy regarding decedents' estates:
"The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all sub-
jects that properly pertain to our foreign relations, and agree-
ment with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the
United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such
countries within the United States, and the disposition of the
property of aliens dying within the territory of the respective
parties, is within the scope of that power, and any conflicting
law of the State must yield. '17
Although the control of an occupation like pawn-broking seems
clearly to fall within the reserved powers of the States, in Asakura
v. Seattle the Supreme Court held invalid a Seattle ordinance limit-
ing pawn-broking to citizens, as being in violation of the treaty
with Japan giving Japanese nationals the "liberty" to engage in
"trade" on the same terms as citizens. Justice Butler said:
"The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited
by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does
not extend 'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,'
it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and other nations.' 8
Neither the Supreme Court nor the course of practice has made
entirely clear the scope or the limitations of the doctrines expressed
in the foregoing cases, but we may safely say that the mere fact
that power to legislate upon some subject is reserved exclusively to
the states does not prevent the validity of a treaty dealing with that
subject.
As for Jefferson's second criterion, that the treaty-making power
is limited to the "objects which are usually regulated by treaty,'"
there appears to be little disposition to say that the United States
cannot be among the first nations to enter into treaties regarding
16. 252 U. S. 416, 432-433 (1920).
17. Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30, 40 (1931).
18. 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924). On this subject, see further Jackson,
The Tenth Amendment versus the Treaty Making Power under the Consti-
tution of the United States, 14 Va. L. Rev. 331 (1928); Boyd, The Ex-
panding Treaty Power, 6 N. C. L. Rev. 428 (1928) ; Borchard, Treaty-making
Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 Yale L. J. 445 (1920) ; Kuhn,
The Treaty-making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, 7
Col. L. Rev. 172 (1907).
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subjects undreamed of in 1789, such as radio or aviation. However,
courts, statesmen and writers are all inclined to refer to the preva-
lence of similar treaties when giving their reasons in support of
the constitutionality of any agreement which has been questionedY'
There still seems validity in Jefferson's first test, that the treaty
"must concern the foreign nation"; at least it is difficult to conceive
of the President and Senate actually entering into international
agreements which do not deal with matters of international concern.
Of course the scope of "matters of international concern" has greatly
broadened with the passage cf time; at the present day in a more
closely knit world there may be grave international concern regard-
ing matters which a few years ago would have been considered
domestic questions entirely inappropriate for action by any but
the nation on whose territory they took place or whose citizens they
immediately affected. Despite this constantly changing standard of
what may be considered "matters of international concern," it should
be noted that in the interval after he was Secretary of State and
before he became Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes said in 1929:
"It seems to me that, whatever doubts there may originally
have been or may yet linger in some minds in regard to the scope
of the treaty-making power, so far as it relates to the external
concerns of the nation there is no question for discussion. I think
it is perfectly idle to consider that the Supreme Court would
ever hold that any treaty made in a constitutional manner in re-
lation to the external concerns of the nation is beyond the power
of the sovereignty of the United States or invalid under the Con-
stitution of the United States where no express prohibition of
the Constitution has been violated.
"... I have been careful in what I have said to refer to the
external concerns of the nation. I should not care to voice any
opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty-making power.
The Supreme Court has expressed a doubt whether there could
be any such.... But if there is a limitation to be implied, I should
say it might be found in the nature of the treaty-making power.
"... The power is to deal with foreign nations with regard to
matters of international concern. It is not a power intended to be
19. In Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 242-243 (U.S. 1872) Justice Clifford
said of the treaty-making power "it must be assumed that the framers of the
Constitution intended that it should extend to all those objects which in the
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper subjects of
negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the nature of our government
and the relation between the States and the United States."
In In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 463 (1891) Justice Field said: "The treaty-
making power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of
negotiation with foreign governments. It can, equally with any of the former
or present governments of Europe, make treaties providing for the exercise of
judicial authority in other countries by its officers appointed to reside therein."
[Vol. 36:299
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exercised, it may be assumed, with respect to matters that have
no relation to international concerns."20
As of the present time, we may agree with Justice Field's state-
ment in Geofroy v. Riggs:
"That the treaty power of the United States extends to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the
governments of other nations, is clear .... The treaty power, as
expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments, and those arising
from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States.
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of
the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of
any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.
Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 541.
But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country."'-"
Numerous dicta in Supreme Court opinions as well as statements
in public documents and by writers support the view that a treaty
cannot validly contravene specific provisions of the Constitution.
22
20. 23 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 194 (1929), quoted in 5 Hackworth's
Digest 7. See also 2 Hyde, International Law 1397 (2d ed. 1945).
21. 133 U. S. 258, 266-267 (1890). Further with respect to the extent of
the treaty-making power, see Feidler and Dwan, The Extent of the Treaty-
.fakhing Power, 28 Geo. L. J. 184 (1939) ; Burr, The Treaty-Making Power
of the United States and the Methods of Its Enforcement as Affecting the
Police Powers of the States, 51 Proc. of the Am. Philisophical Soe'y 269(1912); Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcent (2d ed. 1916).
Older material of value is found in Butler, The Treaty-Making Power of the
United States (1902). A narrow limitation of the power was argued for in
Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power (1915). A notion that
the treaty power is derived primarily from the position of the United
States as a nation is expressed in Potter, Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making
Power of the United States, 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 456 (1934). A special aspect
is thoroughly explored in Cowles, Treaties and Constitutional Law: Property
Interferences and Due Process of Law (1941).
22. Secretary Marcy wrote in 1854 with respect to the possible con-
flict between the consular convention with France which granted certain im-
munities to a consul and the provision of the Sixth Amendment to the Con-
stitution giving the right to defendants in criminal prosecution to have com-
pulsory process to have the attendance of witnesses: "The Constitution is to
prevail over a treaty where the provisions of the one come in conflict with
the other. It would be difficult to find a reputable lawyer in this country who
would not yield a ready assent to this proposition.... Neither Congress nor
the treaty-making power are competent to put any restriction on this con-
stitutional provisions." 5 Moore's Digest 167. Likewise Secretary Blaine wrote
in 1881 that: "A treaty, no less than the statute law, 'must be made in con-
formity with the Constitution, and where a provision in either a treaty or
a law is found to contravene the principles of the Constitution, such provision
1952]
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There has from time to time been discussion of the dictum in
Geofroy v. Riggs regarding the cession by treaty of any portion of
the territory of a state without its consent. In the only cases where
such territory has been ceded, namely in the cases of the north-
eastern boundary in 1842 and the treaty with Mexico for the elimi-
nation of "bancos" along the Rio Grande, consent was in fact ob-
tained from the states of Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas respec-
tively. Despite the dicta, however, views have been expressed by
responsible official that by treaty the United States could cede
territory belonging to a state although discretion would forbid
doing so without the state's consent.2 3
To summarize, then, it may be safely said that the treaty-making
power extends to all matters of international concern where the
conclusion of a treaty may become necessary and desirable-so long
as no specific guarantee of the Constitution is violated. Thus there
would appear to be no constitutional limitation upon the United
States becoming a party to the Genocide Convention, 24 or to the
present draft of the International Covenant of Human Rights,-'
whether or not one may believe that it would be wise policy to do so.
Does this mean that we are to fear that the treaty-making power
will supersede all other governmental organs? Need we really
join some of the recent doubters in the circles of the American Bar
Association, 2 or the 1917 writer who asked:
"Have we granted the President the power, if two-thirds of
the Senate concur, to contract some of our citizens into slavery
on foreign soil in order to acquire for the rest of us desirable
must give way to the superior force of the Constitution, which is the organic
law of the Republic, binding alike on the government and the nation."' 5
Moore's Digest 169. See also Tl~e Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 620
(U.S. 1870) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 370 (1901) ; Chafee, Fedcral
and State Powers under the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights, [19511 Wis.
L. Rev. 389, 433 et seq. See, however, speech of Rep. D. J. Lewis on Febru-
ary 17, 1917, 54 Cong. Rec. 3508 (1917), quoted in 5 Hackworth's Digest 6.
23. See 5 Hackworth's Digest 13; 5 Moore's Digest 171-175; 2 Hyde,
International Law 1398 (2d ed. 1945).
24. See McDougal and Arens, Genocide Convention and the Constitu-
tion, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 683 (1950).
25. See Claudy, The Treaty Power and Human Rights, 36 Cornell L. Q.
699 (1951) ; Chafee, supra note 22; McDougal and Leighton, The Rights of
34'ani in the World Community; Constitutional Illusions versus Rational
Action, 59 Yale L. J. 60 (1949).
26. See for example, OberThe Treaty-Making and Amending Powcrs.
36 A. B. A. J. 715 (1950) ; Holman, Treaty Law-Making, 36 A. B. A. J. 707(1950); Rix, Human Rights and International Law, 35 A. B. A. J. 551
(1949) ; Holman, An Intenrational Bill of Rights, 34 A. B. A. 3. 984 (1948).
See also Reports of the A. B. A. Committee on Peace and Law Through the
United Nations.
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rights?... [Or] an agreement that all the inhabitants of Cali-
fornia shall be transplanted to Formosa, a selected number to be
devoured by cannibals, the rest to labor as Japanese slaves, and
in their place the State of California to be populated by Japanese
citizens with autocratic powers ?"27
Obviously not, even as a purely theoretical matter, in view of what
we have seen regarding constitutional restraints on the treaty
power. And as a practical matter, there is wisdom in Professor
Chafee's statement that:
"The truth is that legislators and office holders in free coun-
tries possess all sorts of enormous powers which will never be
used, because they are controlled by what Dicey calls internal
sanctions. They exercise their authority in accordance with
their character, which is itself moulded by the circumstances
under which they live, including the moral feelings of the time
and the society to which they belong. So love for fundamental
freedoms is a part of ourselves and those whom we elect....
Parliament, being unrestrained by any constitution, has power
to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act any day. It can, but it won't.
King George and the Labor Cabinet can dismantle the British
Navy, without needing any statute. They can, but they won't.
President Truman has complete constitutional 'power to grant
... Pardons for Offences against the United States.' Hence he
might turn every prisoner in Alcatraz loose tomorrow, and
nobody on earth could prevent him. He can, but he won't. '28
In reality we may trust the President and the Senate in this field
at least to the extent of believing that any treaty which violates the
Constitution or which does not deal with a matter of international
concern will have no chance of obtaining favorable action by two-
thirds of our Senators in addition to the President.
However, just because of this great breadth of the treaty-mak-
ing power, including subjects which are reserved to the states so
far as concerns interference through the legislative competence of
Congress, there is need for the inclusion of a federal-state clause2 9
27. Bird, 24 Case and Comment 291 (1917), quoted by Boyd, The Ex-
panding Treaty Power, 6 N. C. L. Rev. 428, 454 (1928).
28. Chafee, supra note 22, at 443.
29. Cf. Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations,
45 Am. J. Int'l L. 108, 121 (1951). The Federal-State clause proposed by the
United States in 1950 for the draft Covenant of Human Rights reads:
"In the case of a Federal State, the following provisions shall apply:
"(a) With respect to any articles of this Covenant which are deter-
mined in accordance with the constitutional processes of that State to be
appropriate in whole or in part for federal action, the obligations of the
federal government shall to this extent be the same as those of parties
which are not Federal States;
1952]
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in some proposed treaties if we wish to ensure that such treaties
will not make a change in the actual division of powers between
the state and federal governments such as was brought about by the
earlier treaties regarding payments of debts, ownership and inherit-
ance of land, or protection of migratory birds. When it is con-
sidered desirable to prevent any such shift of authority to the
federal government, this precaution can and should be attempted
either by careful drafting or by appropriate reservation.
Executive Agreements
Although the Constitution specifies only the treaty-making
process (involving the President and Senate), from the early days
of our government international agreements have been made by
the President which did not constitute treaties in the domestic con-
stitutional sense. Such agreements are known in our constitutional
parlance as "executive agreements," whether they be made by the
President alone or by the President in conjunction with both Houses
of Congress acting by majority vote in each House. They may be
made by the President alone within the scope of his power to
conduct foreign relations or his power as Commander-in-Chief, as
was the case with the "Destroyer-Naval Bases" arrangement of
September 9, 1940,30 with respect to which his authority was up-
held by the Attorney General. 3 ' The power of the President to
enter into such agreements is broad. You will all recall the Supreme
Court's approval of the agreement between the United States and
the Soviet Union known as the Litvinov Assignment in connection
with the recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933, whether or not one
agrees with the application of that agreement in United States v.
Pink" and United States v. Belmont. In the Behnont case Justice
Sutherland said for the court:
"The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith
did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the
treaty-making clause of the Constitution . . , require the advice
and consent of the Senate .... an international compact, as this
was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of
"(b) With respect to articles which are determined in accordance
with the constitutional processes of that State to be appropriate in whole
or in part for action by the constituent states, provinces, or cantons, the
federal government shall bring such articles, with favorable recommenda-
tion, to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the states, provinces or
cantons at the earliest possible moment."
30. 54 Stat. 2405 (1940).
31. 39 Ops. Att'y Gen., 484 (1940).
32. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
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the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol,
a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like that
now under consideration are illustrations." 33
In the case of agreements made by the President under specific
authorization of Congress (as with the American entry into the
ILO), under general congressional authorization (as with postal
agreements and the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements), or on
the condition that the agreement becomes effective only when ap-
proved by Congress (as in the case of the 1942 fur seal agree-
ment with Canada or the funding agreements for the World War I
loans), this power is as broad as the powers of the President alone
added to the powers of Congress in the general field of foreign
affairs. There has been little litigation testing the validity of such
agreements but they have received the approval of the Supreme
Court.3'
There is no doubt that within a very wide field the powers of the
President and Congress to enter into international agreements is
co-extensive with the power of the President and Senate to make
treaties."' The courts have not yet told us the limitations upon this
manner of entering into international agreements. Certainly there
is no reason to suppose that the Constitutional prohibitions limiting
the treaty-making power (such as those of the Bill of Rights) do
not equally restrict such Congressional-executive agreements. And
on the evidence before us, it is by no means sure that the President
and Congress may by executive agreement do everything which may
be accomplished by the treaty-making process; we do not know
whether the President and Congress could invade the sphere usually
reserved to the States so far as can the treaty-making power in
situations like Missouri v. Holland or cases involving land or
engaging in local occupations discussed above. Wallace McClure
has written that:
.. I. the President, acting with Congress, where simple ma-
jorities prevail, can, in the matter of international acts, legally
accomplish under the Constitution anything that can be legally
accomplished by the treaty-making power.... There is nothing
33. 301 U. S. 324, 330-331 (1937).
34. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583 (1912); Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 681-694 (1892).
35. See Catudal, Executive Agreements: A Supplement to the Treaty-
Making Procedure, 10 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1942) ; Levitan, Executive
Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of Foreign Relations
of the U. S., 35 Ill. L. Rev. 365 (1940) ; Moore, Treaties and Executive
Agreenments, 20 Po. Sci. Q. 385 (1905) ; 5 Hackworth's Digest 390-433.
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that can be done by treaty that cannot be done by Congress-
confirmed executive agreement.
'3 6
Leaving aside those who strongly oppose the use of executive
agreements,3 7 we find the more cautious conclusion of Professor
Hyde, a former Solicitor of the Department of State, who wrote
in 1945 that:
"The recourse to executive agreemefits . .. however im-
pressive in scope and development, fails to show that the Govern-
ment has in fact acted on the theory that the President, with or
without the aid of Congress, may conclude in behalf of the
United States any arrangement which could be concluded
through the instrumentality of a treaty. There have been, more-
over, instances where a Secretary of State has felt that for pur-
poses of agreement the use of a treaty was obligatory.
3 8
Whatever may be the ultimate development of the law in this field,
it appears that in practice the Executive and Congress are unwill-
ing to go so far as some writers say that they may. As of the present
time, certain types of international agreement are normally made
by the treaty process alone. In the actual opinion of the public
officers handling such agreements, some fields are regarded as
suitable for action by President and Senate, rather than by Presi-
dent and Congress. But there is a very broad area in which the
President may decide freely whether the agreement should be
framed as a treaty for approval by the Senate or as an agreement
for approval by Congress.
Participation in International Organizations
The United States takes part in the work of international organ-
izations pursuant to both treaties and executive agreements under
approval of Congress. Thus under the treaty process the United
States became, through presidential ratification following the advice
and consent of the Senate, a member of the United Nations,3 the
Organization of American States, 0 the International Union for the
36. McClure, International 'Executive Agreements 364, 386 (1941);
accord McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
dential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 Yale
L. J. 181 and 534 (1945).
37. See Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements: A Reply, 54
Yale L. J. 616 (1945) ; Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, Sen.
Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
38. 2 Hyde, International Law 1416 (2d ed. 1945).
39. 59 Stat. 1031, U. S. Treaty Series 993.
40. 96 Cong. Rec. 13608, 13613.
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Protection of Industrial Property,41 the International Telecommu-
nications Union,42 the International Civil Aviation Organization, 43
and such bilateral organizations as the International Joint Com-
mission (dealing with boundary waters with Canada).4 Organiza-
tions in which the United States acquired membership through
becoming a party to agreements pursuant to the authorization of
both Houses of Congress include the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization,45 the International Labor Organization,46 the International
Monetary Fund,4 7 the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development,4" the International Refugee Organization,49 the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 0
the World Health Organization, 51 and the Universal Postal Union.52
The policy and action of the United States in these international
organizations appears to be controlled by the executive branch of
the government, acting primarily through the Department of State,
although in the case of some of the more specialized agencies other
interested government offices may as a practical matter formulate
policy and control day to day operations. Congress has sometimes
made provision by legislation that representatives of the United
States on the governing bodies of these organizations should re-
ceive the confirmation of the Senate. In the case of the United
Nations, Congress specified in the United Nations Participation
Act of December 20, 1945,"3 that American representatives shall
act in accordance with instructions of the President and shall vote as
directed by such instructions; it authorizes him to make agreements
with the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter for the
supply of armed forces and facilities, the agreements being subject
to the approval of Congress.
41. Treaty of 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, and various revisions, the latest being
53 Stat. 1748, U. S. Treaty Series 941.
42. 49 Stat. 2391, U. S. Treaty Series 867.
43. 61 Stat. 1180, T. I. A. S. 1591.
44. 36 Stat. 2448.
45. 59 Stat. 529, 60 Stat. 1886, T. I. A. S. 1554.
46. 48 Stat. 1182, 49 Stat. 2712. The 1946 amendments to the constitution
of the International Labor Organization were ratified by the President pur-
suant to the advice and consent of the Senate, 62 Stat. 1672, T. I. A. S. 1810;
and a joint resolution of Congress approved the acceptance, 62 Stat. 1151.
47. 59 Stat. 512, 60 Stat. 1401, T. I. A. S. 1501.
48. 59 Stat. 512, 60 Stat. 1440, T. I. A. S. 1502.
49. 61 Stat. 214, T. I. A. S. 1846.
50. 60 Stat. 712, 61 Stat. 2495, T. I. A. S. 1580.
51. 62 Stat. 441, T. I. A. S. 1808.
52. 17 Stat. 283, 304, 19 Stat. 577.
53. 59 Stat 619, 22 U. S. C. §§ 287-287f (1946).
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War Power
Bare mention should be made of the vast war power of the
federal government,5 4 based on the powers of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief and the powers of Congress to declare war, pro-
vide for and maintain the army and navy, etc. (This is not the appro-
priate place to discuss the relationship of the Executive to Congress
in this field, or the extent to which normal constitutional rights and
powers may be modified by the existence of war, nor the relative
extent of Executive and Congressional authority to bring about or
to terminate a state of war.) As Chief Justice Hughes has said:
"... the war power of the Federal Government... is a power
to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of
the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort
to preserve the nation." 5
Here we have in the federal government a tremendously broad
power which has played an important part in the conduct of our
foreign affairs and which must be borne in mind-much as we may
hope that occasion does not arise for its exercise !
Other Constitutional Powers
There are yet other aspects of federal supremacy in matters re-
lating to foreign affairs. Specific constitutional grants to Congress
of powers (over foreign commerce, naturalization, and the like)
result in Congressional legislation which is held to have "filled the
field" and to leave no room for state action in such matters. Thus
federal control over aliens precluded Pennsylvania from requiring
registration of aliens.56 Furthermore, other Constitutional limita-
tions on state action, such as those of the Fourteenth Amendment,
54. See Rossiter, The Supreme Court and The Commander In Chief
(1951) ; Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (1947); Berdahl, War
Powers of the Executive in the United States (1920).
55. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426 (1934)
("Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case"). Note the language of Mr.
Justice Strong for the Court in Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305
(U.S. 1870), that "Of course the power to declare war involves the power
to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legiti-
mately prosecuted." In that case the dissenting Justices joined in an opinion
by Field, in which it was said: "legislation founded upon the war powers of
the government . . .is subject to no limitations, except such as are imposed
by the law of nations in the conduct of war. . . . The war powers of the
government have no express limitation in the Constitution, and the only
limitation to which their exercise is subject is the law of nations." Ibid. at 315.
56. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). Similar restrictions on
state action affecting aliens are found in Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S.
275 (1875).
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restrict our several States in what they may do with respect to
aliens. Thus an Arizona statute, requiring all employers of more
than five workers to hire not less than 80 per cent American citizens,
was held to deny "equal protection of the laws. 15 7
From the International Law Viewpoint
Opinions vary as to the international legal effect of an inter-
national agreement which contravenes the constitutional provisions
of one of the parties. Regardless of invalidity in domestic law, the
weight of international practice supports the validity in the inter-
national sphere of an agreement entered into by a nation's chief
executive. As Legal Adviser G. H. Hackworth said on November
29, 1944, in response to inquiries from Senators in Hearings on the
St. Lawrence Waterway:
"... . in international law the head of the government in en-
titled to speak for the state, and if the President enters into an
obligation with a foreign government, that foreign government is
entitled to rely upon it. It is not under the obligation of enquir-
ing into our constitutional processes. It takes the word of the
head of the State. If the obligation is violated, it is a violation
of an international obligation pure and simple, whether the
President exceeded his authority or not."58
Difficulty may arise when an international agreement clearly con-
travenes the express wording of a written constitutional provision
of which the other party to the treaty may reasonably be expected
to take noticef0 but the better opinion accords with that of Sir
Arnold McNair, now British judge on the World Court, when
he wrote:
"... in concluding a treaty if one party produces an instru-
ment 'complete and regular on the face of it'. . . though in fact
57. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). On Constitutional guarantees
to aliens, see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ; Konvitz,
Alien and Asiatic in American Law (1946) ; Alexander, Rights of Aliens
under the Federal Constitution (1931).
58. Statement of G. H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser, Department of State,
before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Commerce, November 29,
1944, in Hearings on S. 1385, p. 220, quoted in Bishop's International Law
Cases VII-12 (lithoprinted ed. 1951).
59. The Harvard Research in International Law concluded in its 1935
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, that: "A state is not bound by a
treaty made on its behalf by an organ or authority not competent under
its law to conclude the treaty; however, a state may be responsible for an
injury resulting to another state from reasonable reliance by the latter upon
a representation that such organ or authority was competent to conclude the
treaty." 29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 992 (1935). The discussion stressed the
notoriety of constitutional provisions regarding the making of treaties.
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constitutionally defective, the other party, if it is ignorant and
reasonably ignorant of the defect, is entitled to assume that the
instrument is in order and to hold the former to the obligations
of the treaty."60
Thus it would appear that a treaty or agreement which violates
constitutional limitations, and thus is not enforceable in our do-
mestic courts, may nevertheless be obligatory on the United States
internationally and if breached result in liability to pay damages
ordered by an international tribunal. In this respect the situation
resembles that where Congress has by subsequent legislation6 '
superseded the domestic effectiveness as law of the land of a valid
treaty whose international obligation remains unaltered. 2
60. Constitutional Limitations upon the Treaty-Making Power, in
Arnold, Treaty-Making Procedure 6 (1933). To like effect, see Willoughby,
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law 315 (1924) : "Peculiarities of constitu-
tional structures of one state are without international significance to other
states. Each state, as a member of the international society of states, has an
organ of government through which it communicates with and enters into
contractual and other relations with other states. Whatever undertakings are
entered into by such organs are internationally binding upon the state which
they represent." G. G. Fitzmaurice, Assistant Legal Adviser of the British
Foreign Office, wrote in 1934 that: "it is submitted that the only rule which
is both logical and readily applicable from the practical point of view is to
the effect that states have no concern whatsoever with, and cannot as a general
proposition be held to have any knowledge of each other's laws or constitu-
tions; that a state which purports to become regularly bound by an inter-
national engagement, by giving its international ratification thereto, or other-
wise, must be presumed to have complied with all necessary internal con-
stitutional requirements, and that other states are entitled to assume that this
is so. If it afterwards turns out that such requirements have not in fact been
complied with, the state must nevertheless be regarded as being internationally
bound and cannot plead the failure in question as absolving it from its obliga-
tions: any state whose executive has placed it in this position must seek its
remedy by proceeding internally against the executive in question or its
individual members, and externally by denouncing the treaty at the earliest
possible moment; but it cannot plead that the treaty is void ab initio." [1934]
British Yearbook of International Law 113, 136. These statements are sup-
ported by the attitude of the Pernmanent Court of International Justice with
respect to the Ihlen Declaration by the Norwegian Foreign Minister in the
Eastern Greenland Case, in 1933 (P.C.I.J. ser. A/B., No. 53, 71) ; and by
the diplomatic practice discussed in 5 Hackworth's Digest 154-157, and
Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 134-157 (1946).
61. See Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 316 (1914) ; Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889) ; Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U. S. 190 (1888); The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 (U.S. 1870). How-
ever, a treaty will not be deemed modified or abrogated as domestic law by
later Act of Congress unless such purpose on the part of Congress is clear,
Cook v. United States, 288 U. S. 102, 120 (1933).
62. See 5 Hackworth's Digest 186, 194-195. Secretary Hughes wrote
Secretary Mellon on February 19, [923 that: "a judicial determination that an
act of Congress is to prevail over a treaty does not relieve the Government
of the United States of the obligations established by a treaty. The distinc-
tion is often ignored between a rule of domestic law which is established by
our legislative and judicial decisions and may be inconsistent with an existing
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On the delictual or tort side of the law, it is perfectly clear that
the United States, like any other federal state, is not absolved from
international legal responsibility because violations of treaties or
other wrongs to an alien are committed by one of our States. This
is true, whether or not as a matter of constitutional law the federal
government has any control over the action of local authorities in
the matter in question. 3 As Secretary Stimson informed the Pre-
paratory Committee of the Conference for the Codification of Inter-
national Law, May 22, 1929:
"The Federal Government has frequently paid indemnities
for the delinquencies of the States where the States have failed
to furnish protection and redress .... In claims against foreign
States, the United States has refused to recognize the plea
that the federal organization of the respondent State was not
internationally responsible for the maintenance of order and the
provision of effective redress in its constituent political subdivi-
sions. '"64
As illustration selected at random, the United States has been re-
quired by international tribunals to pay damages to Mexico because
of the failure of Texas officials to prosecute and punish the known
Treaty, and the international obligation which a Treaty establishes. When
this obligation is not performed a claim will inevitably be made to which
the existence of merely domestic legislation does not constitute a defense
and, if the claim seems to be well founded and other methods of settlement
have not been availed of, the usual recourse is an arbitration in which inter-
national rules of action and obligations would be the subject of consideration."
Ibid. at 194-195.
63. Discussing the lynching of Italians at New Orleans in 1891, Presi-
dent Harrison said in his message to Congress December 9, 1891: "It would,
I believe, be entirely competent for Congress to make offenses against the
treaty rights of foreigners domiciled in the United States cognizable in the
Federal Courts. This has not, however, been done, and the Federal officers
and courts have no power in such cases to intervene either for the protection
of a foreign citizen or for the punishment of his slayers. It seems to me to
follow, in this state of the law, that the officers of the State charged with police
and judicial powers in such cases must, in the consideration of international
questions growing out of such incidents, be regarded in such sense as Federal
agents as to make this Government answerable for their acts." The United
States paid Italy 125,000 francs as indemnity, pointing out that though the
injury "was not inflicted directly by the United States, the President
nevertheless feels that it is the solemn duty, as well as the great pleasure, of the
National Government to pay a satisfactory indemnity." 6 Moore's Digest 840.
64. League of Nations pub. 1929. V. 10, p. 21, quoted 5 Hackworth's
Digest 595. The League Committee of Experts reported in 1927 that: "any
international responsibility which may be incurred by one of the member
States of a federation devolves upon the federal Government, which repre-
sents the federation from the international point of view; the federal Govern-
ment may not plead that, under the constitution, the member States are inde-
pendent or autonomous." League of Nations pub. 1927. V. 1, p. 105; quoted 5
Hackworth's Digest 595.
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killer of a Mexican citizen, 5 and because a Texas deputy constable
assaulted the Mexican Consul in El Paso after local officials knew
of his hostility toward the Mexican representative ;" similarly, the
United States was ordered to pay damages to Peru when the Sur-
rogate of New York County, in disregard of a treaty with Peru,
failed to give the administration of a Peruvian decedent's estate to
the Peruvian Consul, with resulting loss to the Peruvian heir."7
Indeed, we may well say that in the eyes of international law,
the United States as a sovereign nation has all the powers to carry
on international relations which are possessed by independent na-
tions generally and are considered inherent in sovereignty. As
Justice Field declared for the Supreme Court in upholding the
federal power to exclude certain groups of Chinese aliens:
"While under our Constitution and form of government the
great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the
United States, in their relation to foreign countries and to their
subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which
belong to independent nations." 68
Justice Sutherland followed the same reasoning in the Curtiss-
Wright case, saying:
".... the investment of the federal government with the powers
of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to con-
clude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality .... The power to acquire
territory by discovery and occupation (Jones v. United States,
137 U. S. 202, 212), the power to expel undesirable aliens
(Fong Yuw Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 705 et seq.),
the power to make such international agreements as do not con-
65. Mexico v. United State;, Op. Gen. Claims Comm'n 408 (1927)
(Galvan Case).
66. Mexico v. United State;, Op. Gen. Claims Comm'n 254 (1927)
(Mallen Case).
67. In re Virgil, 4 Moore's International Arbitrations 4390 (an award
of the Mixed Comm'n between Peru and the United States under the Con-
vention of Jan. 12, 1863).
68. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 604 (1889). In Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711 (1893), upholding the con-
stitutionality of a federal law providing for the deportation of certain Chinese
aliens, Mr. Justice Gray said for the court:
"The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested
by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations, and with
all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control, and to make
it effective."
[Vol. 36:299
STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL POWER
stitute treaties in the constitutional sense (Altman & Co. v.
United States, 224 U. S. 583, 600-601; Crandall, Treaties, Their
Making and Enforcement, 2d ed., p. 102 and note 1), none of
which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless
exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.
This the court recognized, and in each of the cases cited found
the warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Con-
stitution, but in the law of nations."6 9
Despite this concentration of legal power over foreign affairs
in the federal government rather than the states, and in the execu-
tive rather than the other branches, need for close cooperation re-
mains-all the more so, indeed, because of this concentration of
authority in the federal executive. When we leave the realm of
naked legal power and turn to that of government in action, we
find that close cooperation between Executive and Congress is
essential. Consultation of President and Secretary of State with
Congressional leaders is necessary, and does take place. Much of
it is informal. Consideration need be given to the question whether
the advantages of informal and intimate contacts can be preserved
while more regularly established institutional procedures are created
to ensure the permanent and frequent use of such consultation.
Senators and Representatives have served ably among our treaty
negotiators and on our UN delegations. In the Department of State
one Assistant Secretary of State deals solely with Congressional
relations. In past times party discipline has often kept Congress
and President together on foreign policy. During the last decade we
have seen the success of "bipartisanship" in bringing about coopera-
tion in foreign affairs when good will and a sense of responsibility
were present among leaders of both major parties.
As for cooperation with the states in international matters
closely concerning certain states, a considerable measure of success
has been achieved in at least some of the more technical fields like
fish conservation. The working together of state and federal govern-
ments in fields of international concern may be facilitated by
interstate compacts or the Council of State Governments as well
as by direct contacts of the officials concerned.
These developments must be borne in mind when seeking a true
69. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318(1936). Cf. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power. An Analysis of lr.
Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale L. J. 467 (1946). On the general
federal power over foreign affairs, see further Corwin, The President: Office
and Powers c. 5-6 (1948); Laski, The American Presidency c. 4 (1940);
Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations (1922).
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picture or evaluation of our national system of "doing business" in
the international sphere. They are as important a part of the whole
as the legal structure which especially interests our profession. They
call for study, creative criticism, and constant improvement, if we
are to make our governmental. structure operate successfully in the
conduct of foreign affairs. Like the strictly legal problems, they too
require widespread popular understanding. Only in this way can
we hope to have the type of foreign policy and action in foreign
affairs necessary in present times for a nation bearing heavy respon-
sibilities in the world.
